In this paper we consider in nite horizon risk-sensitive control of Markov processes with discrete time and denumerable state space. This problem is solved proving, under suitable conditions, that there exists a bounded solution to the dynamic programming equation. The dynamic programming equation is transformed into an Isaacs equation for a stochastic game; and the vanishin discount method is used to study its solution. In addtion, we prove that the existence conditions are as well necessary.
Introduction
Recently considerable attention has been given to the study of risk-sensitive stochasic control problems In this paper we are concerned with in nite horizon risk sensitive stochastic control problems with denumerable state space, discrete time parameter, and bounded cost function. The solution of this problem is based on the existence of a bounded solution to the corresponding dynamic programming equation, which turns out to be a nonlinear eigenvalue problem. In 12] a similar problem is studied for continuous variable systems modelled by di erential equations. However, the approach we follow is technically di erent. For nite state space this problem was solved in 10] using the Perron-Frobenious Theorem and the policy iteration algorithm. Risk sensitive control problems on a nite horizon for hidden Markov models were treated in 9]. In this paper we determine su cient conditions for the existence of a solution to the dynamic programming equation. Our results are based on the observation that the dynamic programming equation can be seen as the Isaacs equation of an ergodic cost stochastic dynamic game (see 1, 12] ). Furthermore, we prove that these su cient conditions are also necessary.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the risk sensitive control problem and a veri cation theorem is presented. Section 3 discusses su cient conditions for the existence of a bounded solution to the dynamic programming equation. Finally, in Section 4 we prove that some of the su cient conditions introduced in Section 3 are also necessary.
Preliminaries
The model. The discrete-time Markov control model we will be dealing with is the following (see e.g. 1] 13]). Let (S; A; P; c) be a Markov control model where the state space S is a (nonempty) denumerable set endowed with the discrete topology, and A is a Borel space, called the action or control space. For every x 2 S, A(x) represents the set of admissible actions when the system is in state x. The set of admissible pairs is de ned by K = f(x; a) : a 2 A(x); x 2 Sg, and is considered as a topological subspace of S A. The transition law P is a stochastic kernel on S given K, and nally, c : K ! IR is the (measurable) one-stage cost function.
Consider the history spaces H o = S, and H t := K H t?1 if t = 1; 2; : : :. An element h t of H t is a vector of the form h t = (x o ; a o ; : : : ; x t?1 ; x t ), where (x n ; a n ) 2 K for n = 0; : : : ; t ? 1, and x t 2 S. An admissible control policy, or strategy, is a sequence = f t g of stochastic kernels t on A given H t , satisfying the constraint t (A(x t )jh t ) = 1, for all h t 2 H t ; t 0. The set of policies is denoted by P. Now, let F be the set of functions f : S ! A, such that f(x) 2 A(x) for all x 2 S. A policy 2 P is stationary if there exist f 2 F such that t (f(x t )jh t ) = 1 for all h t 2 H t ; t 0. Let ( ; F) be the measurable space that consists of the sample space := (S A) 1 and the corresponding product -algebra F. Then, given any initial distribution p o , for each policy 2 P a probability measure P po and a stochastic process f(x t ; a t ); t = 0; 1 : : :g are de ned on ( ; F) in a canonical way, where x t and a t denote the state and action at time t, respectively. When p o is the Dirac measure concentrated at x 2 S, we write P x instead of P po , and the corresponding expectation operator is denoted by E x .
Throughout we assume the following, even when we do not mention it explicitly.
Assumption A. The main problem we are concerned with is to nd su cient conditions to ensure the existence of an optimal stationary policy.
Veri cation theorem. The rest of the proof follows immediately replacing the inequality sign in (2.2) by equality, and repeating the above arguments.
Dynamic programming equation
In this section we turn to the question of existence of a solution to the dynamic programming equation (2.1).
The main result of this paper is the following: Before we give the proof of Theorem 3.1 we will introduce some preliminary results. Let P(S) be the set of probability vectors on S, i.e. The technique we will follow to prove Theorem 3.1 is the standard vanishing discount approach (see, e.g. 1] and the references therein). We consider the corresponding in nite horizon discounted cost stochastic dynamic game. Let W be the upper value function of this game. Then, once we nd a uniform bound for a \di erential" discounted value function, i.e.
h (x) := W (x) ? W (e), with e as in (3.2), the theorem follows by letting ! 1.
First we introduce the in nite horizon discounted cost dynamic game.
Stochastic dynamic game. Let S be the state space, A be the control set for Player 1 (minimizer), and P(S) be the control set for Player 2 (maximizer). The reward function is (x; a; ) 7 ! 1 c(x; a) ? I( jjP( jx; a)), with (x; a; ) 2 K P(S).
The evolution of the system is as follows (c.f. 10] 12]). At each time t 2 f0; 1; : : :g the state of the system is observed, say x t = x 2 S. Then, a control a t 2 A(x) is chosen for Player 1, and t 2 P(S) is chosen for Player 2. Then, a reward 1 c(x t ; a t ) ? I( t jjP( jx t ; a t )) is earned, and the state of the system moves to the state x t+1 according to the probability distribution t .
Strategies. For each t 0, let N t and K t be the set of feasible histories up to time t for Player 1 and Player 2, respectively. That is, N 0 = S and N t = (S P(S)) t S, while K 0 = K and K t = K t K. Generic elements of N t and K t are vectors of the form n t = (x 0 ; 0 ; : : : ; x t?1 ; t?1 ; x t ) and K t = (x 0 ; a 0 ; : : : ; x t?1 ; a t?1 ; x t ; a t ), respectively. A non-randomized strategy for Player 1 is a sequencef = ff t g of functions f t from N t to A, such that f t (n t ) 2 A(x t ) for all n t 2 N t . We say thatf is stationary if, for all t 0; f t depends only on the current state x t , and f t = f 2 F is independent of t. A non-randomized strategy for Player 2 is a sequence~ = f t g of functions t from K t to P(S). Analogously,~ is stationary if, for all t 0; t = : K 7 ! P(S).
Given the initial state x 2 S, and the strategiesf;~ being used, the corresponding state process, x t , is a stochastic process de ned on the canonical probability space (S 1 ; G; Pf ;~ x ), where Pf ;~ x is uniquely determined. We denote by Ef ;~ x the corresponding expectation operator. Equation Proof of Theorem 3.1. We will prove rst that (1 ? )W (e) and h are uniformly bounded. Note that from (3.3) and the de nition of W we have 0 (1 ? )W (x) 1 jjcjj for all x 2 S; (3.9) where jjcjj stands for the supremum norm of c. We next consider h . Let 2 (0; 1), and let f ; be the optimal stationary policies for Player 1 and Also, from (3.7) and Jensen's inequality, and using the fact that c is nonnegative, it follows that
Actually, we can prove, using the same arguments, by induction that for
which, in particular, implies that
where the last inequality is due to Jensen's inequality and (3.2) Let n " 1 be given. Then, (3.9) and (3.13) imply that, by a suitable diagnolization, we may pick a subsequence f n g (denoting it again by f n g) along which h n (x); x 2 S, and (1 ? )W (e) converge to some limits W(x) and , respectively. Thus, the theorem follows from (3.8) and an application of the Dominated Convergence Theorem.
Necessary conditions
In the previous section we proved that su cient conditions to ensure the existence of a bounded solution to the dynamic programming equation ( which is a contradiction. Then, the left hand side of (4.1) holds. The proof of the r.h.s. follows in a similar way and we omit it. Employing (4.1) yields the rest of the theorem.
